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ABSTRACT 
 
In an era of copyright trolling, digital distribution, and 
widespread reappropriation of creative works, the specter of 
“shakedown” copyright infringement litigation looms larger than 
ever before.  Some plaintiffs will hold the prospect of expensive 
and time-consuming discovery over alleged infringers to provoke 
settlement.  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, courts are more 
likely to consider the costs and time requirements of discovery 
when considering a defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  
Several courts have recently indicated a willingness to grant 
motions to dismiss in copyright infringement cases when discovery 
is unlikely to produce material evidence. This Article examines the 
circumstances under which pre-discovery dismissal is likely to be 
granted, the courts’ reasoning for granting dismissal in such 
cases, and the potential effects on copyright infringement 
litigation. 
 
 
 
*1 Evan Brown, University of Washington, Class of 2014. Special thanks to 
Professors Zahr Said and Lea Vaughn of the University of Washington School 
of Law, and to Robert F. Sinclair, Nick Kajka, and Caitlin Forsyth for their 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In an era when costly copyright infringement suits are often 
initiated to provoke settlements, pre-discovery dismissal is 
appealing to defendants and courts alike. Pleading rules previously 
made it difficult to convince a judge to dismiss the case before 
discovery was allowed, but in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
groundbreaking decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, certain types of copyright infringement suits are 
excellent candidates for pre-discovery dismissal. In particular, 
cases in which the court need only compare works of authorship to 
determine whether the plaintiff’s claims are plausible.  Such cases 
can be appropriately controlled with pre-discovery dispositive 
motions. Yet such motions will usually require courts to interpret 
and compare works, a task that carries certain costs.  
This Article examines the circumstances under which a court is 
likely to consider dismissal of a copyright infringement case 
without discovery or trial and the pitfalls defendants may face in 
moving to dismiss. Part I describes the procedure and standards for 
pre-discovery dismissal. Part II explains how defendants in 
copyright infringement cases should challenge the elements of a 
prima facie case for infringement and prevail on defenses to 
infringement on a motion to dismiss. Part III presents four cases 
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that illustrate an emerging trend toward pre-discovery dismissal of 
infringement cases in certain circumstances, particularly where 
comparison of works is sufficient to resolve the claims and the suit 
appears calculated to provoke settlement. Finally, Part IV 
introduces some of the procedural problems presented by pre-
discovery dismissal based on judicial comparison of works. 
 
I. PRE-DISCOVERY DISMISSAL GENERALLY 
 
The Twombly standard has given courts the opportunity to 
more easily resolve cases at a very early stage in the litigation 
process. Defendants who wish to avoid discovery can move to 
dismiss or request judgment on the pleadings where additional 
evidence will prove immaterial. The primary vehicle for dismissal 
is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but 
motions for judgment on the pleadings and even motions for 
summary judgment may accomplish the same result in certain 
cases. Because the plausibility standard requires plaintiffs to plead 
allegations that illustrate what sort of evidence will be necessary to 
resolve the claims, pre-discovery dismissal has become a feasible 
strategy. 
 
A.  Procedural Considerations 
 
A defendant who hopes to avoid the expense and 
inconvenience of discovery can either move for dismissal before 
filing the responsive pleading or move for judgment on the 
pleadings.  If the defendant has no need to plead additional facts, a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is appropriate.2 If a 
response has been filed, the defendant can instead move for 
judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c).3 If the moving 
party relies on information not included in the filed pleadings, the 
court will convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary 
judgment. Such a conversion is important to a defendant seeking to 
avoid discovery, because discovery requests are allowed as part of 
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 
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a motion for summary judgment.4 However, the court has 
discretion to grant or deny any such discovery request. Thus, pre-
discovery dismissal requires a successful 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, 
or a successful argument at the summary judgment stage that 
discovery is unnecessary.  
A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the plaintiff’s claim against 
the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether the case 
can succeed. One important advantage of a 12(b)(6) motion is that 
the defendant can potentially end the suit without even responding 
to the complaint. A major drawback, however, is that the defendant 
cannot argue facts extrinsic to the complaint.5 Thus, affirmative 
defenses generally cannot be raised on a 12(b)(6) motion.6 There 
is, however, an important exception to this general rule: If the 
complaint includes all facts necessary for the defendant to 
“conclusively establish” the defense, it may be raised.7 As the First 
Circuit described the exception, “dismissal . . . is appropriate when 
the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a 
meritorious affirmative defense.”8 That is, the complaint must 
include all facts necessary for the defendant to establish every 
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(2). Further, a non-movant who believes he was 
denied an opportunity to conduct necessary discovery prior to summary 
judgment may appeal on grounds that summary judgment was premature. Vance 
By & Through Hammons v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1148 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(“The general rule is that summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is 
not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery.”); but see Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 628 (6th Cir. 
2002) (holding in a trade dress infringement case that denial of a discovery 
request aimed at producing unnecessary evidence was not error). 
5 E.g., Pegasus Holdings v. Veterinary Centers of America, Inc., 38 F. 
Supp.2d 1158, 1159–60 (C.D.Cal.1998). 
6 United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005). 
7 In re Colonial Mortgage Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003). 
8 Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996); 
accord C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 
2012); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011); Iowa Pub. 
Employees' Ret. Sys. v. MF Global, Ltd., 620 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 
2010); Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Davila, 579 F.3d 109, 113 (1st Cir. 2009); 
Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005); Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 161 
(3d Cir. 2001); Pentagen Technologies Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 175 F.3d 1003, 
1005 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
                                                 
4
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol9/iss2/2
2013] SHAKING OUT THE “SHAKEDOWNS”: 73 
PRE-DISCOVERY DISMISSAL OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES AFTER 
COMPARISON OF THE WORK AT ISSUE 
 
element of the defense.9 Statute of limitations or immunity 
defenses are often raised pursuant to this exception,10 but the 
exception can also be invoked to assert copyright defenses like fair 
use.11 
Documents and other works, usually central to copyright 
infringement cases, can be included among the facts of the 
complaint in several ways. The plaintiff can incorporate documents 
into the complaint by attachment.12 The court can also take judicial 
notice of matters of public record and common public 
knowledge.13 Most importantly, the defendant can ask the court to 
incorporate by reference works that are central to the allegations in 
the complaint but have not been attached, so long as there are not 
material issues of fact relating to their authenticity.14 A court is 
9 A plaintiff is not required to anticipate affirmative defenses and plead 
facts sufficient to defeat them. Only if the elements of the affirmative defense 
can be established from the factual allegations in the complaint can it be raised 
on a 12(b)(6) motion. Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 466 (4th Cir. 
2007). The Twombly decision did not alter this requirement. Id. 
10 Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 
2012); see also Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, Inc., 2:10-CV-1036-
LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 4115413 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010). 
11 See Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 690. 
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. 
Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010); McCready v. eBay, Inc., 
453 F.3d 882, 891 (7th Cir. 2006); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & 
Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555, n.19 (9th Cir. 1989); Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. 
Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1978). 
13 Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2); Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 
649 (9th Cir. 1988); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th 
Cir. 1986). Note that judicial notice may also be taken of “generic elements of 
creative works,” Zella v. E.W. Scripps Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007), publicly accessible works, Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 
2d 1082, 1084, n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2001), and even well-known songs, Burnett v. 
Twentieth Century Fox, 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (C.D.Cal. 2007). 
14 E.g., Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Services, Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 797 (6th 
Cir. 2012); Citadel Group Ltd. v. Washington Reg'l Med. Ctr., 692 F.3d 580, 
591 (7th Cir. 2012); Greenpack of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Am. President Lines, 684 
F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2012); Kensington Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. v. 
Montgomery County, Md., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); Lee v. City of 
Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 
699, 705 (9th Cir. 1998); but see Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 12-30183, 2012 
WL 4902809 (5th Cir. Oct. 17, 2012) (stating that the “one recognized 
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especially likely to grant such a request to incorporate when the 
work is all that is necessary for the court to consider whether the 
complaint states a valid claim.15 Many district courts have held 
that works at issue in a copyright infringement case are good 
candidates for such incorporation by the defendant,16 and at least 
one circuit court has written approvingly of liberally applying the 
incorporation by reference doctrine in copyright infringement 
cases.17 
Of course, affirmative defenses can also be raised in the 
defendant’s responsive pleading. If this is necessary, pre-discovery 
dismissal is still possible through a 12(c) motion for judgment on 
the pleadings.18 Any works at issue may be attached to the 
responsive pleading. This may be a useful tactic if the defendant 
wishes to assert defenses, like fair use, that can benefit from 
information not contained in the complaint, including other works 
not obviously at the heart of the claims. As with a 12(b)(6) motion, 
if information extrinsic to the pleadings is necessary or if 
documents external to the pleadings are attached, the court will 
convert the motion to one for summary judgment. A court may 
effectively convert the motion even if the pleadings contain all 
necessary evidence.19 
exception” to the rule that external documents may not be considered as part of a 
12(b)(6) motion was for documents incorporated by reference). 
15 Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by 
reference a prospectus upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the 
complaint, the defendant may produce the prospectus when attacking the 
complaint for its failure to state a claim, because plaintiff should not so easily be 
allowed to escape the consequences of its own failure.”). 
16 Erickson v. Blake, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1134 (D. Or. 2012); Campbell 
v. Walt Disney Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Chambers v. 
Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002); Int'l Audiotext Network, 
Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995); Canal Image UK Ltd. 
v. Lutvak, 773 F. Supp. 2d 419, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Zella, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 
1131–32; Daly v. Viacom, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121–22 (N.D.Cal. 2002). 
17 Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 
2012) (noting in dictum that incorporation of works like television programs, 
which cannot be physically attached as documents, “makes eminently good 
sense”). 
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 
19 E.g., Swatch Group Mgmt. Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 11 CIV. 
1006 AKH, 2012 WL 1759944 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012). 
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If a Rule 12 motion is converted to a motion for summary 
judgment, the court must provide notice to the parties and an 
opportunity to present evidence consistent with FRCP 56.20 As 
noted above, the court may entertain discovery requests in 
conjunction with a motion for summary judgment,21 but any 
requests should be denied if evidence sufficient to dispose of the 
case is already in front of court.22 This is especially true in the case 
of converted Rule 12 motions.23 Courts are also likely to deny 
discovery requests that are unduly burdensome under the 
circumstances.24 Thus, depending on the circumstances of the case 
and the facts already before the court, a converted motion for 
summary judgment may not present major practical distinction 
from either a 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion.25 
 
B.  Standard for Dismissal 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Twombly, a court would 
only grant pre-discovery dismissal when it was “beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief.”26 This standard required that it 
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); In re G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 295 (2d 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S. Ct. 1195, 89 L. Ed. 2d 310 
(1986).  
21 Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery from 
any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except . . 
. when authorized by these rules”) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b)(2) (“[T]he court 
may . . . allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.”); 
see also Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691. 
22 Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691 (“District courts need not, and indeed ought 
not, allow discovery when it is clear that the case turns on facts already in 
evidence.”) 
23 Swatch Group Mgmt. Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 11 CIV. 1006 
AKH, 2012 WL 1759944 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2012). 
24 Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691. 
25 Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1207 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) specifically gives courts 
the discretion to accept and consider extrinsic materials offered in connection 
with these motions, and to convert the motion to one for summary judgment 
when a party has notice that the district court may look beyond the pleadings.”) 
26 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–6, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). 
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be impossible for the plaintiff to prove his case on the basis of the 
allegations made in the complaint, making pre-discovery dismissal 
very difficult.27 The Twombly decision lowered the bar for 
defendants, requiring that plaintiffs plead sufficient factual 
circumstances to make the claim plausible.28 Prior to the Twombly 
decision, a defendant had to show impossibility in order to prevail 
on a motion to dismiss; after Twombly, a defendant need only 
establish implausibility.  
The Court’s reasoning in Twombly relied heavily on its 
assessment that judicial management of the discovery process was 
often an inadequate check on abusive discovery in antitrust suits.29 
Justice will often prove elusive if “the threat of discovery expense 
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases 
before reaching those proceedings,” and such a situation actually 
incentivizes unmeritorious claims. In order to better protect 
defendants from the threat of unduly burdensome discovery 
requests, the Court determined that the complaint must push the 
claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”30  
As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, this standard should be 
applied “such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to 
be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued 
litigation.”31 The Supreme Court clarified in Iqbal that the 
plausibility standard applied to all civil actions,32 but the warning 
of Twombly was that courts should scrutinize plausibility when 
claims are especially prone to abusive litigation. 
27 See, e.g., Chosun Int'l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 
(2d Cir. 2005) (vacating dismissal because the plaintiff might prove validity of 
copyright on several possible grounds, and noting that the court could properly 
determine a lack of validity as a matter of law “at any of several later stages”). 
28 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. 
Ed. 2d 929 (2007). 
29 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of 
a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the 
discovery process through ‘careful case management,’ [citation omitted] given 
the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking 
discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”) 
30 Id., at 570. 
31 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 2101, 182 L. Ed. 2d 882 (U.S. 2012). 
32 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at  664. 
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Courts have long viewed copyright infringement cases as prone 
to abuse because plaintiffs are often simply trying to cash in on the 
success of a later work to which they did not directly contribute.33 
This has become an even larger problem with the emerging trend 
of copyright trolling—purchasing copyrights from the original 
holders in order to enforce them against infringers for profit.34 The 
Seventh Circuit noted that “[r]uinous discovery heightens the 
incentive to settle rather than defend these frivolous suits.”35 This 
potential for abuse looms large over infringement suits, and courts 
have begun to take into account the extent that particular claims 
appear to be shots across the bow intended to provoke surrender in 
the face of unjustifiable costs. 
 
II. PRE-DISCOVERY DISMISSAL OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
CASES 
 
There are two situations in which a court may grant dismissal 
of a copyright infringement claim. First, a defendant may 
challenge the complaint because a required element of 
infringement cannot be established on the basis of the averments. 
Second, a defendant may assert a defense that relies solely on 
pleaded facts and works before the court. Under certain 
circumstances, even fair use may be established without need for 
evidence external to the pleadings. 
 
 
33 See, e.g., Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (noting 
that it is “usual in plagiarism cases” that “obscurity is taking a long shot at 
success”); Porto v. Guirgis, 659 F. Supp. 2d 597, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting 
that a belated suit of questionable merit against successful filmmakers and 
producers had “the hallmarks of an abusive lawsuit”). 
34 See, e.g., Third Degree Films v. Does 1-47, 286 F.R.D. 188 (D. Mass. 
2012); In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, CIV.A. 11-
3995 DRH, 2012 WL 1570765 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012), report and 
recommendation adopted sub nom., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe 1, 288 F.R.D. 
233 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
35 Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
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A.  Challenges to Prima Facie Showing of Infringement 
 
The most common method for disposing of copyright 
infringement cases prior to discovery is moving to dismiss because 
the plaintiff cannot plausibly establish one or more elements of her 
claim. If any of the elements of copyright infringement cannot be 
established by the facts as averred in the complaint, a court will 
dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim. These elements 
are (1) registration of copyright, (2) validity of copyright, (3) 
copying, and (4) substantial similarity between the allegedly 
infringing work and the copyrighted elements of the original 
work.36 Challenging registration or validity prior to discovery may 
be relatively simple in some cases, but the copying and substantial 
similarity elements will usually require at least comparison of the 
works. 
 
1. Copying 
 
Copying can be established in two ways: by offering direct 
proof that the defendant actually copied the copyrighted work, or 
by offering circumstantial evidence from which the factfinder can 
infer that copying occurred. The former method requires witness 
testimony or other evidence, and thus is not suited to pre-discovery 
dismissal. The latter method allows the court to infer that the 
defendant copied the plaintiff’s copyrighted expression if the 
plaintiff establishes both (1) that the defendant had access to the 
work, and (2) that the allegedly infringing work is substantially 
similar to the copyrighted work.37 The similarity finding generally 
36 See Howard B. Abrams, 2 The Law of Copyright § 14:6 (2013). 
37 E.g., Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 508 
(7th Cir. 1994). Some courts helpfully refer to the substantial similarity portion 
of a copying analysis as involving “probative similarity” to differentiate it from 
the substantial similarity evaluation used to determine whether the defendant has 
appropriated a sufficient amount of the copyrighted work to constitute 
infringement. See, e.g., Soc'y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. 
Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 49 (1st Cir. 2012); Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 
F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2003); Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, n.7 
(5th Cir. 2003); Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 290 F.3d 
548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002); Peel & Co., Inc. v. The Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 394 
(5th Cir. 2001); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d 
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requires the factfinder to examine the works, treating 
parallels “that, in the normal course of events, would not be 
expected to arise independently in the two works” as 
circumstantial evidence of copying.38  
If the plaintiff can provide no direct evidence of copying, a 
court will dismiss an infringement claim if it determines the works 
at issue do not exhibit similarities from which a rational jury could 
infer copying.39 If there are no similarities between the works at 
all, the determination is relatively simple.40 If there are some 
similarities between the works, the court may still infer lack of 
copying if it finds that the similarities would not indicate to 
rational jurors that copying occurred.  For example, similarities 
that extend only to common influences or scènes à faire may not 
lead to rational inferences of copying.41 
 
2. Substantial Similarity 
 
In addition to possibly considering similarity as circumstantial 
evidence of copying, the court will assess similarity to determine 
whether the defendant’s copying is substantial enough to constitute 
actionable infringement. This similarity determination involves a 
somewhat different analysis than that required to establish 
copying, as it requires the court to determine whether a substantial 
enough portion of the expression protected by copyright has been 
taken, and thus whether the copying should be considered 
infringement of that copyright.42 The question presented is not 
Cir. 1997); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, n.1 (2d Cir. 1997). 
38 Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 370 
(5th Cir. 2004)  (abrogated on other grounds). 
39 Armour v. Knowles, 512 F.3d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 2007). 
40 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (“[I]f there are no similarities, no amount of 
evidence of access will suffice to prove copying.”) 
41 See, e.g., Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1220 (9th Cir. 1996); Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994). 
42 Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(“While ‘(r)ose is a rose is a rose is a rose,’ substantial similarity is not always 
substantial similarity.”). However, courts have at times conflated the two 
analyses. See, e.g., Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533, 538 (2d 
Cir. 1938); Ornstein v. Paramount Productions, 9 F. Supp. 896, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 
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whether the similarities can lead a jury to infer anything about the 
defendant’s process of creation; rather, the question is whether the 
amount and manner of appropriation of copyrighted content is 
sufficient to constitute infringement. This question is answered 
primarily by comparing the defendant’s work to the protected 
elements of the plaintiff’s work, although expert testimony to 
provide context or explanation may be relevant. If the defendant 
copied only unprotected elements—for example, portions of works 
in the public domain or abstract ideas—there can be no finding of 
infringement.43 Similarly, if the defendant’s use of protected 
material is clearly de minimis, the court should not find 
infringement.44  
Substantial similarity is essentially a qualitative factual 
determination made by comparing the works at issue. The 
particular method of assessment differs among the circuits, but in 
all jurisdictions the factfinder must make a determination about an 
ordinary observer’s reactions.45 While this sort of determination is 
particularly well suited to a jury, judges are sometimes willing to 
find that their own reactions are sufficiently ordinary to stand in 
for those of any reasonable juror.46 Indeed, as far back as 1932, the 
1935). 
43 Christianson v. West Pub. Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945); Carr v. 
Nat'l Capital Press, 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934). 
44 Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 
1997); DeBitetto v. Alpha Books, 7 F. Supp. 2d 330, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
45 The appellate courts have developed different approaches to substantial 
similarity, but each involves some use of an ordinary observer/intended 
audience test. The Second Circuit’s approach, also followed by the Third, Fifth, 
and Seventh circuits, is to use an “intrinsic test” by which the court decides 
whether an ordinary observer would apprehend protected elements of the 
copyrighted work in the defendant’s work. The Ninth Circuit approach, used 
also by the Fourth and Eighth circuits, adds to the intrinsic test an “extrinsic 
test” by which the court compares elements of the works to determine whether 
there is “a triable issue of fact.” Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1362 (9th 
Cir. 1990). Finally, the Sixth Circuit uses a somewhat different two-step 
approach, first determining which elements of the copyrighted work are 
protected, and then comparing only those elements with the defendant’s work 
under an ordinary observer standard. 
46 E.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Development Corp., 
602 F.3d 57, 64, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 2010); Gal v. Viacom Intern., Inc., 
403 F. Supp. 2d 294, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwave 
Co., 207 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2000); Blakeman v. The Walt Disney Co., 613 F. 
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District Court for the Southern District of New York—no stranger 
to copyright infringement suits—announced that pre-trial 
comparison by the judge “should become the usual method of 
dealing with copyright suits, unless, owing to nice questions of 
originality or access, oral evidence is indicated as necessary.”47 In 
these cases, the judge’s comparison of the works proves effectively 
dispositive, often prior to trial. 
Yet for some works, substantial similarity cannot be 
appropriately determined prior to trial. For instance, some courts 
have held that an understanding of certain types of copyrightable 
material, particularly computer software, is beyond the realm of 
ordinary jurors’ experience, and thus expert testimony is necessary 
to find substantial similarity.48 Works intended for specialized 
audiences will also generally require expert testimony before the 
factfinder can fully comprehend the implications of any 
similarities.49 In general, though, expert testimony is not required 
to decide substantial similarity.50 In fact, some courts consider 
expert testimony “not appropriate” to an analysis of an ordinary 
observer’s response.51 
In order to determine substantial similarity, it is important that 
the court have before it the all of the works at issue. If it does not, 
pre-discovery dismissal is inappropriate. For example, a synopsis 
of the infringing work will not be sufficient, as the court needs 
Supp. 2d 288, 298, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1637 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
47 Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); accord Park v. 
Warner Bros., 8 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); see also Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930). Note, however, that these cases 
predated the development of the modern tests for determining substantial 
similarity. 
48 E.g., Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d 
Cir. 1992); accord Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 65. 
49 E.g., Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 856 (6th Cir. 2003). 
50 E.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 295 (6th Cir. 2004).  
51 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 
562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). Notably, however, this case has been 
criticized by commentators as confusing the prior case law. See, e.g., Mark A. 
Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 719 (2010). 
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further evidence to determine whether the synopsis is truly 
representative of the full work.52 So long as the works are before 
the court, however, either by attachment to the pleadings or 
incorporation by reference, wholly dissimilar works or works in 
which similarity extends only to unprotected elements are good 
candidates for pre-discovery dismissal.53 
 
B.  Affirmative Defenses 
 
An affirmative defense can also be grounds for pre-discovery 
dismissal, so long as evidence beyond the scope of the filed 
pleadings is not necessary to fully consider the merits of the 
defense. If the defense appears on the face of the complaint or is 
raised in the defendant’s answer, the court may consider it. Certain 
defenses, like the statute of limitations, may lend themselves well 
to pre-discovery dismissal but are unlikely to appear on the face of 
the complaint. Other defenses, like laches, estoppel, and 
abandonment, will almost certainly necessitate introduction of 
evidence external to the pleadings. Fair use, the most prevalent 
infringement defense, often also requires additional evidence to 
establish. Under certain circumstances, however, fair use may be 
considered to appear on the face of the complaint if the works can 
be incorporated and if the complaint indicates no external evidence 
will be material. In such cases, comparison of the works may be all 
that is necessary for the court to resolve the issue of fair use. 
Fair use has long been viewed as generally unsuitable to pre-
discovery motions.54 In analyzing fair use, courts attempt to 
determine whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work was 
non-competitive or transformative enough to justify a non-
permissive use, in which case otherwise infringing copying may be 
permissible. Normally, courts accomplish this by using the  
52 See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
53 See Cory Van Rijn, Inc. v. California Raisin Advisory Bd., 697 F. Supp. 
1136, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 1987); Lake v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 140 F. 
Supp. 707, 708 (S.D.Cal.1956); Lewis v. Kroger Co., 109 F. Supp. 484, 485 
(S.D.W. Va. 1952); Lowenfels, 2 F. Supp. at 74. 
54 E.g., Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) 
(Hand, J.) (“[T]he issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law 
of copyright, and ought not to be resolved in cases where it may turn out to be 
moot, unless the advantage is very plain.”). 
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balancing test outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 107, weighing at least (1) the 
purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the entirety of the copyrighted work, and (4) the effect 
of the use on the market for the copyrighted work. Such a 
balancing test is poorly suited to pre-discovery dismissal in most 
cases. In particular, the fourth factor can be heavily dependent on 
the evidence presented by the parties. 
Whether dismissal on fair use grounds is appropriate will hinge 
on whether the complaint includes allegations from which the 
court can infer that other evidence is reasonably likely to have an 
impact on the fair use analysis.55 For example, if the plaintiff has 
alleged actual economic harm or facts indicating potential future 
harm, pre-discovery dismissal on fair use grounds will probably 
not be appropriate. In such a case, the court is highly unlikely to 
find that the fair use defense appears on the face of the complaint, 
and a motion for judgment on the pleadings would probably prove 
futile. In many cases, all elements other than market effect are 
clear after comparing the works and considering the factual 
allegations made in the complaint.  
Parody, a classic but legally complicated transformational use, 
provides an illustrative example of the issues associated with fair 
use. Usually, the analysis will hinge on the third and fourth fair use 
factors—the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying, 
and the effect on the market for the plaintiff’s work.56 In fact, the 
factors are often melded when courts examine parodies, since a 
parody will only be found to have copied an impermissible amount 
of the copyrighted work if it is likely to be a “market substitute.”57 
If it is not a market substitute, it is very difficult to prove market 
55 Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 
2012); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 
L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974) (“When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a 
complaint . . . [t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but 
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”). 
56 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 
1176, 127 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1994); MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING 
COPYRIGHT LAW, 515 (5th ed. 2010). 
57 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
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impact.58 Further, if the effect of the parody on demand for the 
copyrighted work is clearly or admittedly neutral at worst and 
positive at best, the court may be willing to find fair use without 
further evidence.59 If these factors can be clearly resolved by the 
court without further evidence, the court may well dismiss the 
case.60 These considerations will be especially important to a court 
considering fair use as a matter of law prior to discovery. 
 
III. CASE STUDIES IN PRE-DISCOVERY DISMISSAL 
 
Four cases decided within the last several years may serve as 
guideposts for understanding when a court is likely to dismiss a 
copyright infringement case in the post-Twombly/Iqbal era. Both 
the District Court61 and Seventh Circuit62 opinions in Brownmark 
Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners are instructive, as they showcase 
the issues associated with the incorporation of works and the 
determination of whether a defense appears on the face of the 
complaint when works are so incorporated. On the other hand, the 
2008 Sixth Circuit case of National Business Development 
Services, Inc. v. American Credit Education & Consulting Inc. 
illuminates the potential for dismissal when the plaintiff fails to 
describe the works at issue with sufficient specificity to allow for 
incorporation. In the 2010 case Righthaven LLC v. Realty One 
Group, Inc., a District Court dismissed an infringement case by a 
copyright troll company on fair use grounds, which may be 
indicative of how courts will treat similar cases. Finally, the 2010 
Second Circuit case Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone 
Development Corp. exemplifies the type of case that a court is 
likely to consider ripe for substantial similarity analysis at the 
12(b)(6) stage. These cases illustrate the sorts of procedural, 
factual, and equitable scenarios in which courts may be inclined to 
58 Id. at 591–2 (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills 
demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the 
Copyright Act.”) 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 800 F. Supp. 2d 991 (E.D. 
Wis. 2011). 
62 Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
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dismiss infringement claims. 
The District Court’s opinion in Brownmark illustrates the 
difficulties that can arise when attempting to determine whether 
evidence external to the pleadings is necessary when the works at 
issue are appropriately before the court.63 The plaintiffs, creators 
of a viral YouTube video, sued the producers of the television 
comedy show South Park for parodying the video in an episode. 
The complaint alleged that the defendants had infringed by 
including the parody in the episode and it did not allege any 
separate incidents of infringement—for example, in advertisements 
or other promotional materials—despite having opportunities to 
amend both before and after the defendants moved to dismiss. The 
episode was thus central to the claim and could be attached to the 
motion to dismiss. The plaintiff’s copyrighted video was similarly 
incorporated by reference. Once both works were before the court, 
the judge decided that all of the standard fair use factors could be 
analyzed without additional evidence: the video was clearly a 
commercially released parody, the defendant had not taken more of 
the copyrighted work than was reasonably necessary to accomplish 
its purpose, and the parody was not similar enough to the original 
to usurp market demand. The court thus ruled that no further 
evidence would help the plaintiff prevail against the defense of fair 
use.64  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, conspicuously commenting that 
“infringement suits are often baseless shakedowns.”65 The court 
approved of the resolution through comparison, but held that the 
motion to dismiss should have been treated as one for summary 
judgment. Still, the court saw no need to remand since it believed 
that any discovery requests would simply have been denied and 
failure to provide notice of conversion was irrelevant because the 
63 Brownmark, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
64 Id.. At least one court has distinguished Brownmark on this basis, 
implying that if a plaintiff raises factual allegations that indicate that other 
evidence may impact one or more of the fair use factors, mere comparison of the 
works will be insufficient grounds for dismissal before the plaintiff has an 
opportunity to offer such evidence. Katz v. Chevaldina, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 
1316–7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2012). 
65 Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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plaintiff could not have offered any contrary evidence. Under the 
circumstances, the court found no effective difference between the 
two types of motions since comparison so clearly established fair 
use. In its estimation, all that was required to dispose of the case 
were the works themselves, whether they were incorporated by 
reference or offered on motion for summary judgment. By 
describing the works at issue in the complaint with particularity, 
but without pleading facts that made additional evidence 
necessary, the plaintiff had opened itself to dismissal without 
discovery. 
Yet if a plaintiff fails to describe the infringing works with 
sufficient particularity, closing the door on pre-discovery 
comparison, the court may simply dismiss the case for failure to 
meet the plausibility standard. In National Business Development 
Services, the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal on grounds that the 
case was nothing more than a fishing expedition intended to 
uncover implausible acts of infringement through unnecessary 
discovery.66 The plaintiff had sued thirteen defendants for 
infringement but described only in the most general terms the types 
of publications that allegedly infringed its copyrighted materials. 
The court held that such allegations were insufficient under the 
Twombly standard, noting also that “[c]opyright infringement . . . 
lends itself readily to abusive litigation, since the high cost of 
trying such a case can force a defendant who might otherwise be 
successful in trial to settle in order to avoid the time and 
expenditure of a resource intensive case.”67 
Courts may be especially sensitive to cases involving copyright 
trolls. In Righthaven, the court considered whether a real estate 
blogger’s use of a portion of a newspaper article constituted fair 
use.68 Plaintiff Righthaven, “the first copyright troll,”69 had 
purchased the copyright to the article from the newspaper after the 
defendant had published the reproduced portion. Instead of settling 
66 Nat'l Bus. Dev. Services, Inc. v. Am. Credit Educ. & Consulting Inc., 299 
F. App'x 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2008). 
67 Id. at 512. 
68 Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, Inc., 2:10-CV-1036-LRH-PAL, 
2010 WL 4115413 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010) 
69 Ian Polonsky, You Can't Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and 
Copyright Trolling on the Internet, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71 (2012). 
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quickly, as most others targeted by Righthaven had done, the 
defendant raised fair use on a 12(b)(6) motion and the court 
granted dismissal. While the court’s brief opinion does not mention 
abusive litigation, the defendant argued in his motion to dismiss 
that the suit was intended as a source of revenue. Righthaven had 
not even sent the customary cease-and-desist letter prior to 
initiating the suit. It is unclear what persuasive value this had, but 
it is notable that the same court dismissed all of Righthaven’s 
similar suits as well, concluding fair use in some of them.70 In 
cases such as this in which equitable considerations loom large, the 
court may be particularly receptive to dismissal. 
Even if the suit does not appear abusive or intended to provoke 
settlement by threat of expensive litigation, a court may be willing 
to protect the defendant from unnecessary expense if the works at 
issue are before it and it believes that external evidence is 
superfluous. For example, in Peter F. Gaito Architecture, the 
Second Circuit affirmed a dismissal on substantial similarity 
grounds, holding that the similarity between two architectural 
designs could be properly determined as a matter of law after 
visual comparison.71 Moreover, the court explained that a de novo 
comparison of the works by the appellate court is the proper 
procedure for determining whether the lower court ruling was in 
error.72 
In each of these cases, the facts suggested that it was “unfair to 
require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of 
discovery and continued litigation.”73 However, in each case the 
court also felt that information extrinsic to the complaint would not 
have changed the disposition on the merits. As the Second Circuit 
put it, the plaintiff was not “entitled to offer evidence in support of 
70 See, e.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. June 
20, 2011). 
71 Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
72 Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 66; see also, Boisson v. Banian, 
Ltd, 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001); Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer 
California, 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991). 
73 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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his claims.”74 The lack of plausibility serves as the legal grounds 
for dismissal, but where bad motives or indefensible expense are 
suggested by the facts of the case, the court may be more open to 
early resolution of the case. 
 
IV. THE COSTS OF PRE-DISCOVERY COMPARISON 
 
Although pre-discovery dismissal diminishes the overt costs of 
litigation, there are hidden costs that should also be considered by 
the courts. Early dismissal is well suited to cases involving the 
sorts of questions that judges are trained to analyze, but there is a 
danger to expanding the role of judicial comparison outside the 
bounds of judges’ expertise to dispose of infringement cases. Fair 
use presents further problems due to the prominence of market 
impact in the analysis and the difficulty of inferring such impact 
simply by comparing works. 
Comparison of works without contextualizing testimony 
can suffer from inherent difficulties, some of which may not 
always be apparent. For example, substantial similarity frequently 
requires an analysis of whether the overall “feel” of two works is 
similar,75 and this “feel” is often quite dramatically affected by 
context.76 This contextual element is generally distorted in an 
infringement proceeding. The process of comparison itself may 
even convey unintended similarities.77 Thus, the parties try to 
contextualize the works with testimony and other evidence. But 
prior to discovery and trial, they have not had a chance to 
thoroughly establish context; instead, the judge simply decrees that 
his assumed context is correct. 
Considering fair use prior to discovery and trial presents a 
related problem, as the plaintiff is not allowed to present evidence 
of market impact. This impact is often effectively dispositive on 
74 Peter F. Gaito Architecture, 602 F.3d at 65 (quoting the Scheuer 
standard, see supra note 55, as stated in Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 
56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
75 E.g., Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 
2002); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd, 273 F.3d 262, 266 (2d Cir. 2001); see also 
generally Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012). 
76 Tushnet, supra note 73, at 734. 
77 Id. 
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the question of fair use, yet courts seeking to dismiss a seemingly 
abusive suit may be tempted to make hasty assumptions. For 
example, the Brownmark court held that because the parody at 
issue was not a market substitute for the parodied work, it “cannot 
have an actionable effect on the potential market for or value of the 
original[.]”78 However, the Supreme Court has held that a parody 
may have an actionable impact on the market for protectable 
derivative works.79 Given the recent proliferation of television 
programs presenting licensed compilations of YouTube videos,80 
the South Park episode could plausibly have had a negative impact 
on the market for licensing to some such programs. A plaintiff 
should be allowed to present evidence of such an impact, 
especially where the impact on the derivative market is not obvious 
to a judge at the time of comparison.81 The threat of dismissal on 
fair use grounds due to the lack of clear market impact effectively 
requires infringement plaintiffs to anticipate and plead around the 
affirmative defense by pleading such an impact, which is generally 
improper.82 
Despite these sorts of problems, courts will likely continue to 
push for early dismissal of seemingly abusive infringement suits. 
In practice, much will probably depend on the facts of individual 
cases. If the likelihood of abusive discovery or settlement extortion 
is significant, the potential unfairness of pre-discovery dismissal 
may be weighed lightly in the balance. On the other hand, if a suit 
78 Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 693. 
79 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 
127 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1994). 
80 For example, Comedy Central’s Tosh.0, MTV’s Ridiculousness, or 
SyFy’s Viral Video Showdown. 
81 Notably, the Campbell Court held that “when a lethal parody, like a 
scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm 
cognizable under the Copyright Act.” 510 U.S. at 591–592. Yet the Court also 
explained that “the role of the courts is to distinguish between ‘[b]iting criticism 
[that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps 
it.’ [citation omitted]” Id. at 592. In a case such as this—admittedly quite 
unusual—in which the derivative market is one for “biting criticism” that brings 
licensing fees to the copyright holder, the competition is fairly direct and there 
may well be cognizable harm. 
82 See generally 5 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1276 (3d ed.). 
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is not clearly abusive, the problems with reliance on comparison 
and assumption caution against early dismissal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Given the requirements of the plausibility standard, judges are 
at greater liberty to determine that judicial comparison is sufficient 
to resolve a copyright infringement claim. Courts have long 
decided infringement cases on summary judgment by simply 
comparing the works at issue, but the cases discussed may indicate 
a trend toward even earlier dismissal using the same methods. It 
appears that the courts in these cases paid particular attention to the 
potential for high-cost litigation and discovery abuses and the 
resulting incentive to settle unmeritorious cases, sending a message 
to defendants that settlement may not be necessary in the face of 
“baseless shakedowns.” While there are potentially serious issues 
with such early dismissals, and it remains to be seen whether other 
courts will adopt this approach, defendants and plaintiffs alike 
would be well advised to consider the possibility of pre-discovery 
dismissal in any copyright infringement suit, especially those that 
threaten expensive and time-consuming discovery. 
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PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 If a case appears calculated to provoke settlement and the 
plaintiff is unlikely to win on the merits, the defendant may 
wish to pursue pre-discovery dismissal. 
 If comparison of the works at issue will likely prove 
sufficient to resolve the plaintiff’s claim, the defendant may 
move to dismiss for failure to state a claim rather than 
responding and then moving for summary judgment. 
 If the complaint in a copyright infringement case refers to 
the works at issue, the defendant should argue that they 
have been incorporated by reference and attach them to a 
motion to dismiss. 
 If the complaint does not refer to the works at issue with 
sufficient specificity, the defendant should move to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim on grounds that the claim as 
pleaded is not plausibly likely to succeed. 
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